Files
ts-homepage/SECURITY.md
DAM Updater 6800bd71d6 chore: replace stale draft with canonical ts-TEMPLATE form for ts-homepage
- Replace alternate template form (with {{YOUR_TAILSCALE_AUTHKEY}}, sys_module
  cap, hardcoded homepage.damconsulting.net serve.json) with the canonical
  ts-TEMPLATE pattern: Tailscale sidecar + Homepage, both via network_mode
- Use named volume for config dir; default settings/services/bookmarks/widgets
  files included as starting points for the user to customize
- Add SECURITY.md and proper .gitignore (incl. Homepage's auto-generated
  custom.css/custom.js/docker.yaml/kubernetes.yaml/proxmox.yaml stubs +
  logs/)
- serve.headscale.json now uses the actual MagicDNS base domain
  (homepage.damconsulting.net) so the user has a working starting point
  to edit, not a {{service}} placeholder that doesn't resolve
- Verified: dashboard renders at homepage.damconsulting.net
2026-08-03 15:48:56 -04:00

40 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown

# Security Notes for ts-homepage
This repository contains the configuration for deploying Homepage behind a Tailscale sidecar.
## What's committed
- `docker-compose.yml` — service definitions, image versions, env var references
- `.env.example` — template showing required env vars (no real secrets)
- `tailscale/config/serve.json` — Tailscale serve config (committed generic form)
- `tailscale/config/serve.headscale.json` — Headscale variant for testing
- `homepage/config/` — dashboard layout files (services, bookmarks, widgets)
- `README.md` — setup instructions
## What is NOT committed
- `.env` — contains real authkeys
- `tailscale/tailscale-data/` — Tailscale node identity state
- `homepage/images/` — uploaded images
- Any volume data
The `.gitignore` at the repo root blocks accidental commits of these.
## Rotation
- If a `TS_AUTHKEY` was ever leaked, revoke it at https://login.tailscale.com/admin/authkeys (or your Headscale equivalent) and generate a new one.
## Threat model
This deployment assumes:
- The Mac mini is reachable only via Tailscale/Headscale
- All access to Homepage goes through the Tailscale sidecar (no exposed ports)
- The Tailnet itself is trusted
- If you mount the Docker socket, the Homepage container has read access to your Docker daemon — only enable this on a trusted tailnet
If your threat model differs (e.g., you need to expose Homepage to the public internet), review the `AllowFunnel` setting in `tailscale/config/serve.json` and the Tailscale ACL controls carefully before proceeding.
## Reporting
If you find a security issue with this deployment pattern, contact kevin.riordan@damconsulting.llc.