chore: replace stale draft with canonical ts-TEMPLATE form for ts-homepage

- Replace alternate template form (with {{YOUR_TAILSCALE_AUTHKEY}}, sys_module
  cap, hardcoded homepage.damconsulting.net serve.json) with the canonical
  ts-TEMPLATE pattern: Tailscale sidecar + Homepage, both via network_mode
- Use named volume for config dir; default settings/services/bookmarks/widgets
  files included as starting points for the user to customize
- Add SECURITY.md and proper .gitignore (incl. Homepage's auto-generated
  custom.css/custom.js/docker.yaml/kubernetes.yaml/proxmox.yaml stubs +
  logs/)
- serve.headscale.json now uses the actual MagicDNS base domain
  (homepage.damconsulting.net) so the user has a working starting point
  to edit, not a {{service}} placeholder that doesn't resolve
- Verified: dashboard renders at homepage.damconsulting.net

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Security Notes for ts-homepage
+
+This repository contains the configuration for deploying Homepage behind a Tailscale sidecar.
+
+## What's committed
+
+- `docker-compose.yml` — service definitions, image versions, env var references
+- `.env.example` — template showing required env vars (no real secrets)
+- `tailscale/config/serve.json` — Tailscale serve config (committed generic form)
+- `tailscale/config/serve.headscale.json` — Headscale variant for testing
+- `homepage/config/` — dashboard layout files (services, bookmarks, widgets)
+- `README.md` — setup instructions
+
+## What is NOT committed
+
+- `.env` — contains real authkeys
+- `tailscale/tailscale-data/` — Tailscale node identity state
+- `homepage/images/` — uploaded images
+- Any volume data
+
+The `.gitignore` at the repo root blocks accidental commits of these.
+
+## Rotation
+
+- If a `TS_AUTHKEY` was ever leaked, revoke it at https://login.tailscale.com/admin/authkeys (or your Headscale equivalent) and generate a new one.
+
+## Threat model
+
+This deployment assumes:
+- The Mac mini is reachable only via Tailscale/Headscale
+- All access to Homepage goes through the Tailscale sidecar (no exposed ports)
+- The Tailnet itself is trusted
+- If you mount the Docker socket, the Homepage container has read access to your Docker daemon — only enable this on a trusted tailnet
+
+If your threat model differs (e.g., you need to expose Homepage to the public internet), review the `AllowFunnel` setting in `tailscale/config/serve.json` and the Tailscale ACL controls carefully before proceeding.
+
+## Reporting
+
+If you find a security issue with this deployment pattern, contact kevin.riordan@damconsulting.llc.